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Abstract
In this paper we extend Weitzman's result on the relative desirabilitv
of price controls versus quantity controls. We consider the case
where pollution is produced -jointly with a marketed good and the regu-
lator much choose between marketable permits and emission fees for
controlling pollution. In a climate of uncertainty, we show the con-
ditions under which one regulatory instrument is preferred to the
other and show that uncertainty in either good demand or costs, or both,
is sufficient to yield a preference for one instrument over another.
Uncertainty in damages is irrelevant.

I. INTRODUCTION
In a seminal paper a decade ago, Martin Weitzman (1974) considered
the effect of uncertainty on the choice between price controls and
quantity controls for regulating a firm's output of a good. His basic
conclusion was that the existence of production cost uncertainty rather
than demand uncertainty governed whether there would be a difference
between these two forms of control. With such uncertainty, price
controls are preferred if and only if costs have more curvature than
benefits; quantity controls are preferred if and only if benefits have
more curvature than costs. Apparently independently, Adar and Griffin
(1976) and Yohe (1976) developed similar results.
The purpose of this paper is to extend Weitzman 's result to the
case where pollution is produced jointly with a good and it is the
pollution which is to be regulated. In this context uncertainty can
exist in any or all three of good demand, pollution/good production
costs or pollution damage. The question we explore is what types of
uncertainty are important to the relative desirability of emission fees
vs. marketable permits; and further, what characteristics of costs,
demands and damage influence the preference of one mechanism over
another.
Our conclusion is that ^ood demand and/or cost uncertainty is
necessary for there to be a preference of one instrument over another.
And, the preference depends on the slope of pollution damage and good
demand as well as own- and cross-elasticities of marginal cost with
respect to goods and pollution output.
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II. THE MODEL
As does Weitzman (1974), we consider a rather simplified problem.
We consider a competitive industry consisting of many price-taking
firms. For the industry as a whole, amount g of a certain commodity
is produced jointly with pollution b at industry cost C(g,b).
Pollution yields damage D(b) and goods yield benefits B(g) equal to
the consumer surplus associated with the inverse demand function for
the good P(g). Thus,
B'(g) = P(g) (1)
We assume industry costs are strictly convex and that demand is not
upward sloping.
The regulator's problem is to maximize total surplus
S = B(g) - C(g,b) - D(b).
But the regulator is not completely free to adjust S. We assume he
only controls b, and even that incompletely. In fact, we will limit
regulation to be either a marketable permit issuance of b or an
emission fee p. In the case of marketable permits, firms are allowed
to buy and sell emission permits so that the allowed aggregate emis-
sions, b, will be achieved in some efficient manner (Montgomery, 1972)
If the regulator announces an emission fee, all firms pay an amount
equal to the product of the fee rate, p, and their emissions.
Complicating the regulator's decision is the presence of uncer-
tainty as to what market demand, industrv cost and pollution damage
really are. The regulator has a perception of these functions, but
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clouded by uncertainty. This presents no difficulty if the regulator
can continually adjust the number of outstanding pollution permits or
the level of the emission fee. Generally, however, this is imprac-
tical. Thus we take the simplified view that the regulator must decide
once and for all
,
on the optimal level of permits, b* , or emission fee,
p*, based on ex ante perceptions and then live with whatever ineffi-
ciencies are revealed after industry and the environment respond to b*
and p*.
To introduce uncertainty, we let good demand, costs and damage
be parameterized by three indeoendently distributed random variables,
n, 8, and e. These variables reflect the true state of the world
which eventuallv (too late) is revealed to the regulator.
Surplus is then given by
S(g,b,n,9,e) = B(g,n) - C(g,b,9) - D(b,e). (2)
We assume S is strictly concave with respect to g and b. Convexity of
D(b) is sufficient for this, but overly restrictive. The regulator
will choose b* or p* to maximize the expected value of S.
It should be pointed out that while the regulator does not know n
,
9, or e , the industry being regulated does know n and 9 either expli-
citly or can rapidly learn their values by rapidly adjusting output in
response to market forces.
We now consider how firms will respond to a permit issuance and an
emission fee.
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A. Industry Response to Regulation
Our concern here is how industry reacts to a paticular permit
issuance b or emission fee p. Our goal is to develop reaction func-
tions g(b), b(b), g(p) and b(p) which can be substituted into equation
(2). Surplus will then only be a function of random variables and the
level of the regulation so the optimal expected-surplus-maximizing
regulation can be found.
Consider first the permit issuance. If the regulator releases b
permits to pollute, firms will respond by providing b pollution in the
aggregate. Production of goods will be determined by the market:
P(g,n) = CjCg/b.e) (3)
where C. denotes the partial derivative of C with respect to the first
argument. Thus, the response g to any (optimal or non-optimal) per-
mit issuance b is the solution of equation (3).
Now consider the imposition of an emission fee, p. Industry will
choose output levels g and b to maximize profits. In particular,
marginal costs will be set equal to the fee for pollution and to good
price for the good. For any fee, p, the resulting g and b will satisfy
P(g,n) = C^g^.e) (4a)
p = -C
2
(g,b,0) (4b)
Thus, equation (3) implicitly defines industry response to a
marketable permit issuance of b and equation (4) inplicitly defines
industry response to an emission fee.
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B. The Regulator's Choice
We now determine the optimal choice of permit issuance, b*, or
emission fee, p*. In choosing the optimal permit issuance the regula-
tor wishes to choose b* such that
S[S(g(b*),b*,n,9,e)l = max £ [S(g(b) ,b,n ,9 ,e ) ] (5)
b
where £ is the expectation operator over the random variables n , 9
,
and e and where g(b) is the reaction function defined implicitly by
equation (3). The solution to equation (5) must satisfy first order
conditions for a maximum:
£ t s i!b
+ s
2*
= s i [Brc i ]lb " S - V =0 - (6)
But from equations (1) and (3), B = C. ; therefore
£ [-C
2
(g(b*),b*,9)] = £ [DjCb*^)] (7)
Equations (3) and (7) thus implicitly define b*.
Similarly, in choosing the optimal emission fee, we wish to find
p* which satisfies:
£ [s(g(p*),b( P*),n,9,n)l = max £ [S(g(p) ,b(p) ,n ,6 ,n) 3 (8)
p
where once again, g(p) and b(p) are reaction functions and are defined
implicitly by equation (4). First order conditions for a solution to
(8) are:
&"- suw£->w$£ ' s i^ +s2p SUVC ,'^ '«§»• < 9)
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But from equations (1) and (4a), we know B. - C. = 0. And from
equation (4b), p = "C^. Thus equation (a) can be rewritten as:
MD.(b(p*),e)^-l
p* = 1 jr 4E— (10)
dp
We can obtain db/dp by totally differentiating equation (4), since (4)
holds for all p, not just p*. The result can be solved for db/dp:
Ah C, ,(g,b,6) - P,(g,n)Q = Li 1 (11)dp
c^
2
(g,b,e) + c
22
U,b,e)[P
1
(g,n) - (c n (g,b,e)]
Thus, equation (4), (10) and (11) implicitly define p*.
III. PRICES VS. QUANTITIES
Our question now is, which optimally designed instrument, p* or
b*, gives the greatest expected welfare? Define the relative advan-
tage of prices over quantities as:
A e &{S[g(p*),b(p*),n,e,e] - S[g(b*),b*,n,9,el} (12)
The quantity A defines the difference in total expected social surplus
between the two instruments. Clearly, if A > 0, emission fees will be
preferred to quantities for purposes of regulating emissions; and if
A < 0, emission permits will be preferred to prices.
In order to evaluate equation (12), we must move from the implicit
definition of g(p), b(p) and g(b) in equations (4) and (3), and develop
explicit expression for these reaction functions so that the sign
of A may be deduced. To do this, we will consider second-order Taylor
series expansions of B, C and D about the point (b,g) = (b*,£ [g(b*)]):
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A A a £3
B(g,n) - B(n) + B (n)(g-g) +«P (13a)
c(s,b,e) - c(e] + c (e)(g-g) + cb (e)(b-b) +—(b-br ( i3b)
+ -|£ (g-g) 2 + Cgb(g-g)(b-b)
D(b,e) - D(e) + D,(e)(b-b) +
-jp (b-b) 2
(13c)
Note in the above that the zero and first order terms are random
variables, whereas the second order terms are constants. The use of
second order approximations and the assumption that the second-order
coefficients are constants are probably the strongest assumptions of
this paper. These assumptions are the same as those adopted by
Weitzman, and the interested reader is referred to the justification
and criticism which appeared in the context of the Weitzman paper (see
Malcomson, 1978; Weitzman, 1974, 1978; Laffont, 1977). In essence, we
are assuming that uncertainty acts to shift the demand, marginal cost
and marginal damage functions. The slope of these functions is unaf-
fected by uncertainty.
Differentiating equation (13), one obtains expressions for inverse
demand, marginal cost and marginal damage.
A. A A
P(g,n) - B (n) + B (g-g) (14a)
O ft ft
A A A A A
c.(g,b,e) * c (el + c (g-g) + c .(b-b) (14b)
1 % gg gb
A A A A A
c
2
(g,b,e) - c
b
(e) + cbb (b-b) + cgb (g-g ) (i4 c )
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DjCb.e) - D.(e) + Dbb (b-b) (14d)
Because benefit, B, is consumer surplus, its slope is the inverseAAA
demand for the good, P(g,n). Denote the expected value of B , C , C,
g 3 bA
b g' g' b and D, respectively. Note first of all, that
b
because we have a competitive market, good price always equals marginal
good production cost. Thus, from equation (3), (4a) and (14a, b) for
any permit issuance or fee (optimal or nonoptimal), it is always true
that
A AAA AAAA
B
g
(Ti) + B
gg
(*-g) - c
g
(e) + c
gg
(g~g) + c
g b
(b_b)
-
(15)
In particular, let b = b* = b and take expectations of both sides of
equation (15) to obtain
B" = C . (16a)
g g
Furthermore, substituting equation (14) into equation (7) yields
C
b
=
-D
b
. (16b)
We now use the approximation to benefits, damages, and costs to
derive explicit expressions for the reaction functions to p*. Because
of our expansion about b* and [g(b*)], we do not need an explicit
expression for g(b*). Combining equation (4b) and (14c) and using
(15), we obtain, for any p,
fp+c,(e)][B -c ] - c . [b (n)-c (e)]
b(p) = b + ^ ** gg = SL_S § (17a)
E
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?
[p+C (9)]C + C [B (n)-C (0)]
g(p) - g + " ~ ^—
S
(17b)
* * » a
where E - CUU (C -B ) - C . . (17c)bb gg gg gb
Because C is strictly convex and demand is not upward sloping, E is
always positive. Differentiating equation (17) we obtain
t
B - C
gg ggb (p) - ^ v ^ (18a)
C
g (p) =-^ (18b)
neither of which is a random variable. Consequently, the denomina-
tor nf pquation (10) cancels and equation (10), (14d), (16) and (17a)
can be combined to obtain
p* F = -C
b
F (19a)
where F = (C..+D,, ) (C -B ) - C J. (19b)bb bb gg gg gb
From the strict concavity of S in equation (2), we know that F in
equation (19a) is negative. Thus, equation (19a) implies
P* = -Cb
. (20)
Equation (17) can now be rewritten as
a(6)[B -C ] - C B(n,0)
b(p*) = b + gg g * ^ (21a)
o(e) c , + c,,6(n,e)
g(p*) = g + *
b
„
bb (21b)
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where a(0) = C (9) - C
fe
(21c)
(n,e) = B ( n ) - c (e)
g g
Note that S(a(8)) = 0. Furthermore, from (15)
;(b*) ,; + B(n,9) (21d)
C - B
gg gg
We are now ready to evaluate the sign of A (equation (12)), the rela-
tive advantage of prices over quantities. Substitutiong equation (13)
into equation (12), one obtains
A A AAA A
A = £ {[B (n)-C (6)] (g(p*)-g) - [C (9)+D (e)] [b(p*)-b] (22)
+ ( B„„"c „„) U(p*)"g] II - (C..+D.. ) [b(p*)-b]*72gg gg bb bb
A A AAA A
- c
. [g( P*)-g] [b( P*)-b] - [b (n)-c (e)] (g(b*)-g)gb g g
A A
- (B -C ) [g(b*)-gP/2}.
gg gg J
Substituting equation (21) into equation (22) and simplifying reduces
equation (22) to
A =
k
S [(C -B )a(0) + C ,8(9, n)]
gg gg gbAAA A
2[C,, (C -B ) + C ,
2
]
2
bb gg gg gb
'gb
'bb
C -B
gg gg
- D
bb
(23)
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2
The denominator of the expression in braces above is E (equation
17c) and, as we have already noted, is never zero. Thus, the braced
expression is always nonnegative and the sign of A hinges on the sign
of the right-hand expression in brackets. Further, a necessary and
sufficient condition that there be a preference for one instrument over
the other (i.e., A * 0), is that there be some uncertain in costs or
good demand (or both) so that the braced expression is nonzero.
Uncertainty in damage is unimportant. This result is embodied in the
following proposition.
Proposition : In an industry with a bad (b) produced jointly with a
good (g), assume industry costs C(g,b) are strictly convex, that demand
for the good is not upward sloping and that damage D(b) is convex.
Further assume consumer surplus from the good, Droduction costs and
damage are approximated by second order Taylor series expansions with
zero and first-order coefficients uncertain. Then the sign of the
expected value of the surplus gain (A) from using ex ante emission fees
rather than marketable emission permits for control of b is determined
by
sign (A) = sign
'gb
B - C
gg gg
+ Sb " Dbb (24)
excent when there is neither uncertanty in costs nor good demand
(i.e., the numerator of the expression in braces in (23) is zero)
in which case A = 0.
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The result ts very similar to that of Weitzman (1974). In fact,
the proposition reduces trivially to Weitzman's result for the case of
C , = 0, no cross-cost effects. With C , = 0, the marginal cost of
gb gb
good production is independent of the level of the had and conversely,
the marginal cost of pollution control is idependent of the level of
good. In such a case, prices are preferred over quantities if the
absolute slope of marginal bads production cost exceeds the slope of
marginal damage.
The first two terms on the right-hand-side of (24) constitute the
effective slope of the marginal cost of producing the bad, after
subtracting out the marginal benefits associated with good production.
Thus, as with Weitzman's result, whether or not prices are preferred
to quantities depends on the relative slope of marginal damage and
marginal (net) costs of bad production.
To see this more closely, define the "market" benefits of pro-
ducing the bad (excluding pollution damage) as
S(b) = B(g,b) - C(g,b) (25a)
with g defined by
B (g,b) = P(g) = C (g,b) (25b)
The regulator then balances S(b) with D(b) in regulating the output of
b. Equation (25a) can be differentiated to obtain (using equation
25b)
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S"(b) - - B fc "C bh (26)
Kg gg
Compare equation (26) with equation (24) and note that In the proposi-
tion, prices are preferred if the absolute slope of marginal market
benefits (S"(b)) exceeds the slope of marginal damage. This is the
same result as Weitzman's. It should be noted that equation (25a)
cannot be used directlv in Weitzman's theorem since S(b) is shared
between society and the industry; i.e., some of the benefits acrue to
the regulator and some to the firm being regulated.
III. INTERPRETATION
In order to better understand the proposition, we will consider
four special cases in more detail: perfectly inelastic and perfectly
elastic good demand; and linear and kinked damage (equivalent to per-
fectly elastic and perfectly inelastic damage). The case of perfectly
inelastic good demand is embodied in the following corollary:
Corollary 1 : With the assumption of the Proposition, assume further
A. A
that good demand is perfectly inelastic. If C uu - D, , is positivebb bb
(negative), then price (quantity) instruments are the preferred
decentralized control instrument, provided there is sufficient uncer-
tainty for there to be a preference (A + 0).
Proof : In proving this corollary, the limit of the entire expression
(23) must be taken as B +-<». The sign of the expression is then
gg
equivalent to the sign of C,, - D, . .
bb bb
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This is essentially the same as Weitzman's (1974) result that the
performance of fees over standards is determined by the sum of the
second derivatives of the cost and damage function. However, in this
corollary there may only be uncertainty in good demand and not in costs
or damage and still be a preference for one instrument over the other.
These results for the case of inelastic good demand can be seen
graphically. Figure 1 focuses on production of bads with both the
expected value of marginal costs (C, ) and damages (D, ) shown (solid
b b
lines) as well as ex post values of these functions (broken lines).
The optimal price instrument (p*) and quantity instrument (b*) will
be set based on where the expected costs and damages intersect. But
the e_x post quantities of goods and bads will be determined by the
position of the dashed lines. Thus, the shaded areas in the Figure
show the welfare losses associated with the two instruments. In the
figure we consider two cases distinguished by the sign of C,, - D, . .
bb bb
In Figure la, marginal production costs for the bad are more
steeplv sloped than marginal damage (C,, - D,, is positive), which
bb bb
from equation (24) should imply the superiority of emission fees.
This is, in fact, illustrated, because the shaded welfare loss asso-
ciated with fees in Figure la appears to be considerably smaller than
that associated with quantity controls. Exactly the opposite effect
occurs in Figure lb, where C, , - D, , is assumed negative.bb bb
The opposite of inelastic demand is the case of a totally elastic
demand function for the good.
-15-
Corollary 2_: With the assumptions of the proposition, and assuming that
demand for the good is totally elastic, if
2
gg bh gb
_
bb
C
is positive (negative), then price (quantity) controls are the pre-
ferred decentralized control instruments, provided there is sufficient
uncertainty for there to be a preference (A * 0).
Proof : Because inelastic good demand implies B = 0, the corollary
follows directly from the Proposition.
This corollary is similar to the one encountered in the case of
inelastic good demand. The difference is that instead of the slope of
the marginal cost curve for the bad (C,,), we deal with the ratio of
bb
the determinant of the Jacobian of the cost function to the slope of
the marginal cost curve for the good— in a sense the curvature of the
overall cost function relative to the curvature of the cost of good
production. Refer to Kolstad (1982) for a detailed graphical
interpretation of this corollary.
Finally, we consider the slope of the pollution damage function.
Corollary 3_: With the assumptions of the proposition, and assuming
there is sufficient uncertainty (A * 0), then for linear damage (kinked
damage), a price (quantitv) instrument is preferred for pollution
control.
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Proof: Linear damage implies D,, = 0, and kinked damage impliesbb
D, , + °°. The corollary follows directly from the Proposition,bb
This corollary, too, is in the spirit of Weitzman, in that
constant marginal damages are best conveyed to the firm through an
emission fee. Conversely, if damage is kinked, then marginal damage
is changing rapidly in the vicinity of the kink so a quantity message
is best relayed to the firm. Further discussion of these corollaries
may be found in Kolstad (1982).
V. CONCLUSIONS
The basic purpose of this paper has been to extend Weitzman'
s
(1974) analysis to the case where pollution is produced jointly with a
good and there is uncertainty in good demand as well as production
costs and pollution damage. This would appear to be a much more
realistic situation, closer to that found in the "real" world. Our
basic result is that the relative slope of damage and pollution costs
still determine the preference for price or quantity instruments.
However, uncertainty in good demand alone is adequate to yield a pre-
ference for one over the other; there need not be uncertainty in costs,
-17-
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Figure 1: Inelastic good demand.
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